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ABSTRACT  __________________________________________________________________________ 
Over the period 1982–2006, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) estimates the return on in-
vestments of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational companies averaged 9.4 percent per year after 
taxes while U.S. subsidiaries of foreign multinationals earned on average only 3.2 percent. We estimate 
the importance of two factors that distort BEA returns: technology capital and plant-specific intangible 
capital. Technology capital is accumulated know-how from intangible investments in R&D, brands, and 
organizations that can be used in foreign and domestic locations. Technology capital used abroad gener-
ates profits for foreign subsidiaries with no foreign direct investment. Plant-specific intangible capital in 
foreign subsidiaries is expensed abroad, lowering current profits on foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
increasing future profits. We develop a multicountry general equilibrium model with an essential role for 
FDI and apply the same methodology as the BEA to construct economic statistics for the model economy. 
We estimate that mismeasurement of intangible investments accounts for over 60 percent of the differ-
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Over the period 1982–2006, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates the return on
investments of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinational companies averaged 9.4 percent
per year after taxes while U.S. subsidiaries of foreign multinationals earned on average only
3.2 percent. These series are displayed in Figure 1.1 The ﬁgure shows that the diﬀerences
in these returns is not only high on average, but persistently high. Furthermore, when
compared to estimates of returns of U.S. businesses on domestic operations returns on
investments abroad are 4 to 5 percentage points higher, and returns on investments made
by foreign companies in the United States are 1 to 2 percentage points lower. With one-
third of U.S. C-corporation proﬁts coming from their foreign subsidiaries, understanding
why their foreign operations appear to do be doing so much better than their domestic
operations is both interesting and important.
In this paper, we estimate the importance of unmeasured intangible investments that
distort measured returns on foreign direct investment. We do this by developing a multi-
country general equilibrium model that includes intangible capital. The main theoretical
innovation is the inclusion of two distinct types of intangible capital: intangible capital
that is plant-speciﬁc and technology capital that can be used at multiple locations. Exam-
ples of technology capital include accumulated know-how from investments in research and
development (R&D), brands, and organizations that is not speciﬁc to a plant. Technology
capital used abroad generates rents for foreign subsidiaries with no foreign direct invest-
ment. Thus, given technology capital, there is an essential role for foreign subsidiaries.
We apply the same methodology as the BEA to construct economic statistics for our
model economy. We emphasize that the names for the BEA statistics are not appropriate
in our model world. In the model world, which has no uncertainty, the after-tax returns
1 The U.S. return is direct investment receipts from Table 1 of the U.S. International Transactions
divided by the U.S. direct investment position at current cost from Table 2 of the U.S. International
Investment Yearend Positions. The foreign return is analogous: direct investment payments divided
by the foreign direct investment position at current cost.
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Figure 1. BEA Rates of Return on Foreign Subsidiary Capital
on all investments are equal. Consequently, all diﬀerences in returns that are constructed
with the BEA methodology are due to diﬀerences in the timing and magnitude of foreign
intangible investment and income.
We ﬁnd that abstracting from either technology capital or plant-speciﬁc intangible
capital has large consequences for the BEA-measured rates of return on U.S. foreign sub-
sidiaries and U.S. aﬃliates of foreign companies. We estimate that the mismeasurement
of intangible investments leads to a 4 percentage point diﬀerence in FDI returns for the
period 1982–2006, with the return on foreign FDI in the United States very close to what
theory predicts and the return on U.S. FDI higher than predicted.
Our ﬁnding rests critically on diﬀerences in the timing and magnitude of inward
and outward FDI in the United States. After WWII, foreign direct investments in the
2United States were negligible and did not begin to rise signiﬁcantly until the late 1970s.
If foreign companies make large expensed investments in plant-speciﬁc intangible capital
when setting up operations, proﬁts of foreign aﬃliates will appear low relative to those
of domestic companies.2 This is the case for U.S. aﬃliates of foreign companies. On the
other hand, if signiﬁcant intangible investments have already been made, then accounting
proﬁts will appear high as they include the rents from this intangible capital. This is the
case for U.S. companies whose direct investment incomes have been large throughout the
post World War II period.
To estimate the return diﬀerentials for inward and outward FDI, we use secular trends
for the period 1960–2006 in U.S. current account series—namely, net factor incomes and
net exports—to tie down the paths of the key exogenous parameters of our model and
then use these inputs to make predictions for asset holdings and returns. The key pa-
rameters are countries’ degree of openness to foreign multinationals’ technology capital,
technology capital’s share of income, and the relative size of the United States vis a vis
foreign countries.
The degree of openness is the degree to which foreign multinationals’ technology cap-
ital is allowed to be used in production by foreign multinationals. In a country that is
closed, only domestic ﬁrms operate; there is no FDI income, and FDI returns are zero.
As a country opens up, it gains because foreign companies have technologies that can be
operated in the country through their FDI and at any location within the country. As
countries open, productivity increases because more multinationals have more locations in
which they can use their technology capital. The extent of the increase depends on the
income share of technology capital. We ﬁnd that the degree of openness and the share of
income to technology capital are important determinants for FDI incomes.
The relative size of a country is a function of its population relative to that of other
2 High startup costs of new FDI by foreign aﬃliates in the United States is one explanation that the
BEA gives for comparatively low returns on foreign direct investment in the United States.
3countries and its total factor productivity relative to that of other countries. We ﬁnd
that the path of the relative size of the United States vis a vis foreign countries is an
important determinant for the path of U.S. net exports. In particular, we ﬁnd that the
recent slowdown in population growth in countries hosting U.S. FDI accounts for much of
the recent decline in the U.S. trade balance.
As an external check, we also compare the model’s prediction for the U.S. consumption
share of GDP and the ratio of U.S. GDP to world GDP. We ﬁnd that the trends in the
model shares are consistent with data from U.S. national accounts and the Conference
Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) (2008).
The model that we develop has eﬃcient domestic and international goods and asset
markets. Multinationals are price-takers using diﬀerent technologies in competitive mar-
kets to produce a single composite good that is freely shipped anywhere in the world.
All investments, whether at home or abroad, earn the same rate of return. We abstract
from ﬁnancial market and trade barriers to isolate the impact of mismeasuring intangible
investments.3 We also assume that U.S. and foreign technologies are symmetric, with nei-
ther having a comparative advantage in production of technology capital. An open issue
is whether extending the theory to include ﬁnancial frictions or asymmetric technologies
can account for the remaining gap in the FDI return diﬀerential.
Our paper is related to the empirical literature concerned with improving measures of
cross-border asset returns and external positions.4 This literature has been engaged in a
lively debate about whether or not there are indeed signiﬁcant cross-border rate of return
diﬀerentials on portfolio assets and direct investment assets. Most agree that there are
3 Caballero et al. (2008) and Mendoza et al. (2006) develop general equilibrium models with ﬁnancial
frictions to estimate the eﬀects on the current accounts of unanticipated capital liberalizations. Fogli
and Perri (2006) estimate the impact of lower U.S. business cycle volatility on the U.S. trade bal-
ance due to lower precautionary savings. None of these papers consider the impact of unmeasured
investments.
4 See, for example, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2008).
4return diﬀerentials in FDI and the focus of research—both inside and outside the BEA—
has been on improving estimates of the market value of foreign subsidiaries. Market values
include the value of intangible assets and, if used when constructing FDI returns, could
potentially eliminate the puzzling diﬀerential between return on U.S. foreign operations
and foreign operations in the United States. Unfortunately, these researchers face two
diﬃcult problems: market values of subsidiaries and parents are not separately available
and current estimates of direct investment at market value are not meaningful if ﬁrms
have capital that can be used simultaneously at home and abroad. In this paper, we take
a diﬀerent approach to this diﬃcult measurement problem: we allow for the fact that
actual and measured returns may diﬀer and use theory to infer the diﬀerential in measured
returns. We also focus on the direct investment position at current cost which is the
empirical counterpart to foreign subsidiary (tangible) reproducible costs in our theory.
More closely related to our work are two recent papers that use the neoclassical growth
model, augmented to include intangible capital, to study U.S. foreign direct investment.
Bridgman (2007) uses a model with plant-speciﬁc intangible capital and evidence on R&D
expenditures by multinationals to adjust reported rates of return on FDI. He adjusts
reported rates by the ratio of tangible to total capital. He ﬁnds that the adjusted return
diﬀerential is considerably smaller than the reported return diﬀerential and attributes
this ﬁnding to cross-country diﬀerences in tangible to intangible capital ratios in foreign
subsidiaries. Kapicka (2008) uses a growth model that includes technology capital to
estimate the welfare gains of a fully open United States. He ﬁrst shows that the model
with technology capital successfully predicts the time paths of inward and outward foreign
direct investments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of U.S. policies
that impact on the timing and magnitude of inward and outward FDI. Section 3 describes
the theory we use. We ﬁrst derive the aggregate production function for a closed economy
5with technology capital and then extend the derivation to the multicountry case. We then
use the aggregate production functions in a multicountry general equilibrium model. In
Section 4, we choose parameters based on U.S. data and compare equilibrium paths of our
model with trends in U.S. time series. Conclusions are in Section 5.
2. History of U.S. Policies Related to FDI
The ﬁndings of our quantitative analysis depend critically on the timing and magnitude of
inward and outward FDI in the United States, which in turn depends on how we model the
relative degree of openness to foreign technology capital in the United States and elsewhere.
Our theory of FDI is consistent with U.S. current account facts if we model the United
States after World War II as initially less open to inward FDI than the rest of the world
was to U.S. outward FDI, with a rapid change occurring during the 1970s. In this section,
we review key policies that discouraged inward FDI during the period following the war.
These policies lead us to conclude that our modeling of U.S. openness is reasonable.
2.1. Bretton Woods System of Fixed Exchange Rates
In compliance with the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, the U.S. Secretary of Com-
merce was asked to report on foreign direct investment in the United States. Appendix
G, entitled “Investment Motivation,” outlines reasons why foreign companies invested or
did not invest in the United States. According to the report, “currency undervaluation
acted as a strong disincentive to foreign direct investment in the United States, both be-
cause it placed an artiﬁcially high price on dollar-denominated assets, and because it gave
foreign producers an inherent cost advantage in selling in U.S. markets through exports”
(Department of Commerce 1976, p. G-40).
The United States suspended convertibility from dollars to gold in August 1971. Be-
tween 1971 and 1973, the dollar depreciated 35 percent relative to the German mark, 26
6percent relative to the Japanese yen, 27 percent relative to the French franc, 28 percent
relative to the Dutch guilder, and 35 percent relative to the Swiss franc.
In February 1973, the Bretton Woods currency exchange market closed.
2.2. Interest Equalization Tax
Another disincentive for foreign multinationals considering investing in the United States
was the high cost of ﬁnancing under the interest equalization tax (IET) (Department of
Commerce 1976, p. G-58). The IET, which was eﬀective in 1963, was a tax of 15 percent
on interest received from foreign borrowers. The intent of the tax was to eliminate the
deﬁcit in the balance of payments. The eﬀect was to close U.S. capital markets to foreign
aﬃliates in the United States.
The interest equalization tax was removed in 1974.
2.3. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Laws
According to Damm (1970), foreign companies considering investment in the United states
were concerned with a “growing trend toward extraterritorial application of U.S. laws and
regulations” (p. 41). Ellis (1970) provides many examples of extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust law, including cases where the economic activities took place outside the
United States.
Although there was no formal dissolution of extraterritorial application of U.S. an-
titrust law, some foreign governments reacted to orders of the U.S. courts by making it
illegal for their companies to comply with them. For example, The Watkins Report (1968)
recommended that the Canadian government “enact legislation to prohibit compliance
with foreign antitrust orders, decrees, or judgments.”
72.4. National Security Acts
During World War I, national security concerns were the impetus for FDI restrictions in
certain industries and for the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917.
The TWEA allowed the president to “investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power,
or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest.” President Wilson invoked the TWEA
during the war to seize all U.S. assets of German companies. He also seized all foreign-
owned radio stations, including those owned by British companies. President Roosevelt
invoked the TWEA during World War II to seize German and Japanese assets in the
United States.
According to Graham and Marchick (2006), uncertainty about whether the U.S. gov-
ernment would seize foreign assets in an international emergency was resolved in 1976
when the TWEA was supplanted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA). The IEEPA stipulated conditions of an international emergency and took away
the right to transfer title of foreign assets to the United States in such an emergency.
Until the IEEPA in 1976, the TWEA was the primary regulation concerned with the
impact of foreign direct investment on national security.
3. Theory
In this section, we describe a multicountry general equilibrium model that builds on Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2007). We begin by describing the technologies available to multina-
tionals. We then describe the problems faced by citizens in the diﬀerent countries. Finally,
8we describe how BEA accountants would record transactions with the data from our model
economy.
3.1. Technologies
A country’s stock of technology capital is the number (or measure) of technologies owned
by its multinationals. A technology is a production unit that can be operated in any
country and at any location within a country. An example of such a technology is a
company brand or patent that can be used—with inputs of tangible capital, plant-speciﬁc
intangible capital, and labor—in many locations simultaneously. The number of locations
in a country is proportional to its population.
We start by describing production in one country and then extend the analysis below
to a multicountry world.
Single-Country Production
We model a country as a measure of locations. Firms choose locations in which to set
up operations and use their technology capital. Production also requires inputs of labor,
tangible capital, and plant-speciﬁc intangible capital. For simplicity assume that z is a
composite of these three factors of production. One unit of technology capital and z units
of the composite input at a given location produces y = g(z). Consider the case of brand
equity with units of technology capital indexed by m. For ease of exposition, assume for
now that m is discrete and that m = 1 is the Walmart brand, m = 2 is Home Depot brand,
etc. The number of locations constrains the number of operations for each brand. In other
words, Walmart can operate only one store per location, and Home Depot can operate
only one store per location. It may be the case that both Walmart and Home Depot have
stores at the same location.
We want to derive the total output for a country with locations N, technology capital
9stock M, and composite input Z. Now, we treat the number of locations and the number
of technologies as real variables and choose z : [0,N] × [0,M] → I R+ to solve
Y = F (N,M,Z) = max
z
 
g (z (n,m)) dndm subject to
 
z (n,m) dndm ≤ Z.
We put conditions on g(·) so that there is an optimal plant size. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that it is increasing and strictly concave.
Given the properties of g(·), the maximal production allocation requires that all brands
be operated in all locations, with an equal amount of the composite input in each of
the NM production units. Thus, the aggregate production function is F(N,M,Z) =
NMg(Z/(NM)). Suppose that g(z) = Az1−φ, where A is a parameter determining the
level of technology and φ ≥ 0. The aggregate production function in this case is
Y = F (N,M,Z;A) = A(NM)
φ Z1−φ. (3.1)
Below we assume that A may vary by country. The aggregate product F displays constant
returns in the two factors of production M and Z: F(N,λM,λZ) = λF(N,M,Z). Notice,
if φ = 0, then (3.1) nests the standard speciﬁcation which is linear in Z.
Multicountry Production
In the multicountry case, the only factor that can be used both at home and abroad
is technology capital (e.g., brands). Let i index the country where production is occurring,
and let j index the country of origin of the multinational. The number of locations of
country i is Ni. The technology capital used by multinationals from j is Mj. The com-
posite capital-labor input in country i used to produce output with technology capital of
multinationals from j is Z
j





























10which is the sum of outputs of all multinationals, where Ai is the technology parameter
for multinationals from i operating in country i, and Aiσi is the technology parameter
for foreign multinationals operating in i with σi ≤ 1. If we maximized (3.2) subject to




















This expression facilitates comparison to the closed economy case. If σi = 0, (3.3) is
equivalent to (3.1).
Degree of Openness
As before, we include the technology parameter Ai which is common to all production
units. In the multicountry case, there is an additional parameter in the speciﬁcation of the
production technology in (3.2), namely σi. The parameter σi is a measure of the degree
of openness of country i. A value of 1 implies a country is totally open—so domestic and
foreign ﬁrms have the same opportunities in country i. A value less than 1 implies that
domestic and foreign ﬁrms are not treated equally. In particular, there are costs to foreign
ﬁrms, and these costs have the same eﬀect as if they had lower TFP than domestic ﬁrms.5
Another interpretation of openness is possible if we set ωi = σ
1/φ














Here, ωi can be interpreted as the fraction of foreign technology capital permitted to be
brought in and used by foreign multinationals. If ωi is equal to zero, costs are inﬁnite and
no foreign ﬁrms are permitted. This is the closed-economy case. As we noted before, in
this case, country i has constant returns in technology capital and the composite input Z.
5 A natural extension of this model would include industries, some of which are permitted to operate
and some of which are blocked.
11If ωi is greater than 0, the sum of output across the open countries is greater than the
sum of output for the same countries if they were closed. It is as if there were increasing
returns when in fact there are none.
This scale eﬀect is more evident if we rewrite (3.4) in terms of eﬀective technology
capital. Let Mi be the eﬀective capital used in country i, that is Mi = Mi + ωi
 
j =i Mj.
Substituting this into (3.4) yields the same expression as (3.1). The diﬀerence is that the
eﬀective capital stock is larger when countries are open.
Composite Input



















with inputs of tangible capital, K
j
T,i, plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, K
j
I,i, and labor L
j
i.
Multinationals own the technologies that we have described above. Households own
equity of these multinationals. We turn next to a description of the problems solved by
each.
3.1.1. Multinationals




pt (1 − τdt)D
j
t, (3.6)
where dividends are the sum of dividends across all operations in all countries indexed by
































i = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, X
j
I,i is investment in plant-speciﬁc capital which is split
among locations in country i that j operates, and X
j
M is the technology capital investment
12of multinational j used in all locations in which j operates. The output produced by j in




i ;Ai,σi), where F is deﬁned (3.1) with Z
j
i deﬁned
in (3.5). The wage rate in country i is Wi and is the same rate paid by all multinationals
operating in i.







T,it). (The latter is called undistributed proﬁts in the U.S. NIPA
accounts and reinvested earnings in the U.S. International Transaction accounts.) Taxable
proﬁts are equal to sales less expenses, where the expenses are wage payments, tangible
depreciation, and expensed investments on plant-speciﬁc intangible capital and technology
capital. Taxable proﬁts in country i are taxed at rate τp,i. We assume that multinationals
do not engage in transfer pricing to avoid taxation.6
The capital stocks of the multinational next period are given by
K
j



















Here, we assume that depreciation rates can diﬀer for the three types of capital.
3.1.2. Households
The stand-in household in country i chooses consumption, hours of work, and next period






Cit/Nit,Lit/Nit + ¯ Lnb,it/Nit
 
Nit
6 Evidence of Bernard et al. (2006) and estimates of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (1999)
suggest that corporate tax revenues lost to transfer pricing are small, on the order of 1 to 2 percent


































t + rbtBit + κit


where Ci is total consumption of households in i, Ni is the total population in i, Li is
the labor input in the business sector, ¯ Lnb,i is the labor input in the nonbusiness sector,
S
j
i is holdings of equities from j which have a price V j and dividend Dj per share, Bi is
holdings of debt which earns interest at rate rb. Taxes are levied on consumption at rate
τci, labor at rate τli, and dividends at rate τd.7 Transfers plus nonbusiness income less
nonbusiness investment is summarized by κi.8
We assume that the number of locations in country i is proportional to the population
of i. In other words, we assume that a foreign multinational can set up more operations
in a country like the United States that has many consumers than a country like Belgium
with few. Without loss of generality, we use a proportionality constant of 1 and therefore
use Nit to denote both the number of locations and the number of people in i.
We abstract from uncertain events since we are interested in secular trends. Thus,
the returns on household assets are equal in equilibrium and the composition of their
portfolio is not uniquely determined. When choosing parameters, we pre-set debt holding
and foreign share holdings and let equilibrium conditions determine the total net worth of
households.
The equity value for multinationals from j is given by
V
j















which is a sum of the values of its capital stocks at home and abroad. The prices of each
7 The dividend tax rate does not depend on i. If it did, we would need to allow for clientele eﬀects.
8 Activity in the nonbusiness sector is added (and treated exogenously) in order to ensure that the
NIPA aggregates are of the right order of magnitude.
14type of capital depend on tax rates. (See McGrattan and Prescott (2008) for the derivation
of (3.8).)
3.2. Comparison of BEA and Model Accounts
We want to compare the time series for our model world economy with those published by
the BEA. To do so, we have to construct variables comparable to those that are reported
in the BEA national and international accounts.
We start with the national accounts and in particular gross domestic product (GDP).
GDP for country i at date t is given by




T,it + ¯ Xnb,it + NXit (3.9)
where NXi is net exports of goods and services by country i. Here, we are assuming that
C includes both private and public consumption expenditures and ¯ Xnb includes all non-
business investment expenditures of households, nonproﬁt institutions, and governments.
Another way to calculate GDP is by adding up all domestic incomes. Speciﬁcally, if we
sum up compensation of households (WiLi), total before-tax proﬁts of businesses operat-












total nonbusiness value added (¯ Ynb,i), we have GDP from the income side:







This has to be equal to product in (3.9). From (3.9) and (3.10), it is easy to calculate net
exports as total output—business plus nonbusiness—produced in country i less the sum
of consumption and all investments.
Given that we are interested in measurement, it is worth noting that GDP for country
i, as deﬁned in (3.10), is not a measure of production of country i in the model economy.
In the model economy, total production in country i is Yi + ¯ Ynb,i. GDP is lower because
some investments are expensed.
15Next, consider adding ﬂows from and to other countries. The BEA’s measure of GNP
is the sum of GDP plus net factor income from abroad.9 Net factor receipts (NFR) are the












t + max(rbtBit,0). (3.11)
Analogously, net factor payments (NFP) from i to the rest of the world are the sum of
FDI income of foreign aﬃliates in i sent back to foreign parents and portfolio incomes from












t + max(−rbtBit,0). (3.12)
Adding net factor income to net exports and to GDP, we have the current account (CA)
and GNP, respectively:
CAit = NXit + NFRit − NFPit
GNPit = GDPit + NFRit − NFPit.
The net factor income ﬂows (in (3.11) and (3.12)) are used by the BEA to construct
rates of return on capital in foreign subsidiaries. There are several problems with these
measures of income, however. First, a substantial part of net investment (reinvested earn-
ings) is not included. In the case of income from foreign direct investment, only net
investment in tangible capital is included. In the case of portfolio income, no net invest-
ment is included. Second, even if all net investment were to be included, income from the
same investment of technology capital is made in diﬀerent geographic locations.
To illustrate the problem, we construct returns on foreign direct investment using
the BEA methodology for the following simple example with two “countries”: the United
9 Here, we abstract from wage compensation from abroad because it is negligible in the U.S. accounts.
10 Equity holdings are categorized by the BEA as direct investment when the ownership exceeds 10
percent. Otherwise it is categorized as portfolio income.
16States indexed by u and the rest of world indexed by r. In this case, the actual returns
that U.S. multinationals earn on their three types of investments are:
rTt = (1 − τp,rt)
 
















which follows from the maximization problem in (3.6). These returns are equated in
equilibrium and, therefore, we can write rt = rTt = rIt = rMt, where rt is the common
rate of return on all investments in the model’s world economy.
Reported returns of U.S. subsidiaries from the rest of the world are equal to the
FDI income (dividends plus reinvested earnings) divided by the tangible capital stock of
U.S. multinationals abroad:





















which is not equal to rt when either technology capital or plant-speciﬁc intangible capital
is nonnegligible. Interestingly, the reported return can be higher or lower than the actual
return. It is higher if investment of U.S. foreign subsidiaries in plant-speciﬁc intangible
capital, Xu
I,rt is not too large. It is lower otherwise.
The question we address in the next section is, How large is the impact of this mis-
measurement when the model is parameterized to generate time series consistent with the
U.S. national and international accounts?
174. Quantitative Predictions for the United States
In this section, we parameterize our model for the United States and the rest of world
so that the secular trends in the model current accounts line up with counterparts in
the U.S. international accounts compiled by the BEA. We then use the model to make
predictions about measured returns and asset holdings of foreign subsidiaries.
In the Data Appendix, we provide information about the sources of our data, which
are primarily from the U.S. national and international accounts. Prior to constructing
any statistics, we adjust measures of U.S. GDP and U.S. GNP to exclude consumption
taxes and intermediate ﬁnancial services and to include depreciation of consumer durables
and capital services of consumer durables and government ﬁxed capital. When we use
the terms GDP and GNP, we mean the adjusted series. The adjustments imply average
measures of GDP and GNP that are about 3.8 percent higher than the BEA’s published
series. (See McGrattan and Prescott (2008) for further details.)
For the rest of world, we use data on transactions with the United States and measures
of population and GDP from the GGDC. In computing total GDP, we restrict the rest of
world to regions doing nonnegligible trade and FDI with the United States. The list of
these regions and the countries within is provided in the Data Appendix.
In McGrattan and Prescott (2008), we check the sensitivity of our analysis to changes
in the model’s parameters.
4.1. Model Inputs
Table 1 summarizes the parameters held constant when computing the equilibrium paths
of our model. Table 2 summarizes all time-varying parameters. The series are smoothed
to allow us to focus on trends. Table 3 summarizes the initial capital stocks.
Populations and total factor productivities are assumed to grow over time at rates γN
18and γA, respectively. Trend growth rates are assumed to be the same for both the United
States and rest of world. Trend growth in population is set at 1 percent per year and trend
growth in total factor productivity at 1.2 percent per year. These rates, along with income
shares in Table 1, imply a growth rate of 3 percent per year for output,
γY = (1 + γN)
1−(1−φ)(αT +αI)
(1−φ)(1−αT −αI) (1 + γA)
1
(1−φ)(1−αT −αI) − 1,
on a balanced growth path. We do allow for deviations from trend through variations
in the populations and TFP of the rest of world relative to the United States, which we
describe below.
Utility is logarithmic with the weight on leisure equal to 1.32 ensuring that the time
to work is consistent with U.S. aggregate hours. The discount factor is chosen so that the
average annual real interest rate is slightly above 4 percent.
Parameters of the nonbusiness sector were set at U.S. levels. These include the fraction
of time to nonbusiness activity at 6 percent, the nonbusiness investment share of GDP at
15.4 percent, and nonbusiness value-added as a share of GDP at 31.2 percent.
In choosing tax rates, we ﬁxed the two that have little impact on capital returns,
namely τc and τl, and set them equal to average rates for the United States. For the
consumption tax, we take the ratio of sales and excise taxes to total consumption, implying
τc = 0.073. For the labor tax rate, we use the methodology of Prescott (2002), implying
τl = 0.29. Although some countries, such as those in Europe, have higher consumption
tax rates than labor tax rates, what is relevant is the intratemporal tax wedge, 1 − (1 −
τl)/(1 + τc). For our parameter choices, this wedge is equal to 34 percent.
The key constants for our analysis are depreciation rates and income shares since they
determine the magnitudes of the stocks of capital. In the case of tangible capital, we
have measures from the BEA. We set the depreciation rate for tangible investment δT at 6
percent per year to be consistent with BEA tangible investments and ﬁxed capital stocks.
19Given a rate of depreciation, we then set αT equal to 0.23 so that the model’s business
tangible investment is consistent with U.S. business investment.
In the case of the two types of intangible capital, we have direct measures of only some
intangible expenditures. Furthermore, there is an added complication in our model with
technology capital: the size of the technology capital stock also depends on the countries’
degrees of openness. What we do, therefore, is to use measures of expenditures on R&D
and national advertising and estimates of expenditures on organizational capital to provide
a plausible range for investment in technology capital. In addition, we use measures
of U.S. equity values to indirectly infer the magnitude of the remaining plant-speciﬁc
intangible investment. In McGrattan and Prescott (2008), we do sensitivity analysis and
show how the results change as we change the depreciation rates and income shares for
these intangible capitals.
The National Science Foundation (2007) reports U.S. R&D expenditures over the
period 1960–2006 that averaged 2.45 percent of GNP. The U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1960–2008) and Universal McCann (2005–2007) report estimates of national advertising
expenditures that are on average equal to 1.19 percent of GNP for the period 1960–2006.
Together, these imply an investment share of 3.64 percent; we view this as a plausible lower
bound if we abstract from organizational know-how which is more diﬃcult to measure.
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005) have estimates of investment in organizational capital
for the period 1988–2000 and conclude that it is in the range of 1.7 to 2.25 percent of GNP.
Thus, for our benchmark parameterization, we chose a target level of total investment in
technology capital in the range of 5.3 to 6 percent of GNP.
For market values, we use the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Fund Accounts which
reports market values for corporate and noncorporate equity. Since there are very large
movements in corporate equity values, ranging from 0.4 times GDP to 1.8 times GDP over
20our sample, we set parameters so that the model and data are consistent in the 1960s.11
During this decade, the value was relatively stable and averaged 1.5 times GNP.
With these targets for technology capital investment and market value, we set the
benchmark shares and annual depreciation rates for intangible capital as follows: φ = 7
percent, αI = 7 percent, δM = 8 percent, and δI = 0 percent. A value of δM = 8 percent
which is intermediate to estimates for depreciation of R&D and organizational capital. In
our sensitivity analysis we show that the main results are unaﬀected if we double δM or
set it equal to 0.12 With δM = 8 percent, a value of φ = 7 percent yields an average ratio
of technology capital investment to GNP of 5.3 percent and an average ratio of technology
capital stock to GNP of 0.53 over the sample period 1960–2006.
For plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, we started with a depreciation rate for plant-
speciﬁc capital δI equal to zero and set αI so that the predicted market value of U.S. busi-
nesses is about 1.5 times GNP over the period 1960–1969. If we set the depreciation
rate higher and adjust αI to keep the stock of intangible unchanged, then our results are
unaﬀected. For our benchmark parameterization, the average plant-speciﬁc intangible in-
vestment is 3.9 percent of GNP and the average ratio of plant-speciﬁc intangible capital
to GNP is 1.2 over the sample period 1960–2006.
Table 2 reports all time-varying parameters used to compute the model’s equilibrium
paths. Since we are matching the secular trends in the model and in the data, we do our
computations on a 5-year basis (with all relevant constants appropriately adjusted). We
smooth the time series and report the smoothed series at 5-year intervals.
The second column shows the trend in the ratio of the rest of world population to
11 In McGrattan and Prescott (2005), we show that changes in taxes and regulations played a quan-
titatively important role in the secular movements of corporate equities, but the theory used there
and extended here is not well suited to modeling transitions after tax reforms.
12 When we check sensitivity of our results to changes in constants, we also adjust the paths of openness
parameters and relative size to ensure consistency of the U.S. and model current accounts. This is
described below.
21that of the United States. Data are from Conference Board and Groningen Growth and
Development Centre (2008) and the countries in rest of world are listed in Data Appendix.
In 1960, the rest of the world’s population was about 8.2 times larger than that of the
United States. The population ratio rose to 9.4 by 1990 and then fell back to 9 by 2006. For
the benchmark parameterization, we assume the decline in population continues. However,
in McGrattan and Prescott (2008), we show that this assumption does not aﬀect our main
ﬁndings.
The next two columns show eﬀective U.S. tax rates on dividends and proﬁts. The
source of the dividend tax rate is McGrattan and Prescott (2003, Figure 1). The tax rate
on proﬁts is equal to the tax liability of corporations divided by corporate proﬁts (with the
Federal Reserve Bank proﬁts subtracted from both the numerator and denominator). We
assume the same rates apply to both corporate and noncorporate business income. Because
the United States taxes worldwide incomes, the relevant tax rates for both U.S. FDI abroad
and FDI in the United States are the U.S. rates.
The last ﬁve columns of Table 2 contain time-varying inputs that are set so as to
generate model current accounts with trends that are similar to the U.S. current accounts.
The ﬁrst two of these inputs are the openness parameters {σrt} and {σut} that determine
how open the rest of world is to U.S. multinationals and how open the United States is to
foreign multinationals, respectively.
The openness parameters are crucial for determining the level of incomes of foreign
direct investment. If they are equal to zero in all periods, the model predicts no FDI
income at all. As we noted in Section 2, to generate the patterns of U.S. time series, with
U.S. FDI receipts higher than FDI payments, it is necessary to set σrt > σut for all years
considered. We also chose a path for σut that was increasing faster than σrt during the
22second half of our sample to capture the faster growth in income of U.S. aﬃliates of foreign
companies which occurred in the late 1970s.13
The next input, which is listed in column seven of Table 2, is the total factor pro-
ductivity of the rest of the world relative to that of the United States. Without loss of
generality, we scale U.S. TFP in such a way as to have U.S. GDP in 1960 equal to 1. Both













Size is a measure of eﬀective persons. In McGrattan and Prescott (2007), we show that
the size of a country is what is relevant for output and productivity. In models without
technology capital, only relative TFPs matter.
In terms of the exercise of ﬁtting the current accounts, the path of relative size is most
important for the trade balance since variations in population or TFP require shipments
(or loans) to equate capital output ratios. In McGrattan and Prescott (2008), we show
that the slowdown in rest of world population relative to the United States has been an
important contributor to the recent large decline in the U.S. trade balance.14
The last two columns in Table 2 are per-capita U.S. debt But/Nut and the U.S. holding
of foreign shares Sr
ut. Technically, these are not exogenous parameters. However, because
households are indiﬀerent to the composition of their portfolios, we need to pre-set two of
the three asset holdings and allow the third to be endogenously determined. We do this in
such a way as to match the secular movements in interest net income and total portfolio
net income.15
13 To simplify the ﬁxed point problem of matching the U.S. and model current account series, we
restricted the paths as follows: σrt = ar +brt and σut = au(1+bu(tanh(cu +dut)) and chose values
for the coeﬃcients {ar,br,au,bu,cu,du}.
14 In McGrattan and Prescott (2008), we compare theoretical and quantitative predictions for produc-
tivity and net exports in models with and without technology capital.
15 To match portfolio equity incomes, we need an implausibly large drop in foreign share holdings in
23The last set of inputs needed to compute equilibrium paths are the initial capital
stocks. The values we use are summarized in Table 3 and are found as follows. We use the
fact that the ratio of plant-speciﬁc intangible capital to tangible capital is equated across
countries and technologies on the equilibrium path and assume this is true in the initial
period. We also restrict the initial capital stocks by assuming that there are no jumps in
inital investment growth rates. The initial stocks are set so that the growth rates for all
investments are equated in the ﬁrst and second period. To pin down the ten initial stocks,
one more restriction is needed. The last restriction that we impose is that U.S. GDP is 31
percent of world GDP in 1960.
4.2. The United States, 1960–2006
We now use our parameterized model economy to study the United States international
accounts over the period 1960–2006. We ﬁrst show that the model incomes and products
exhibit the same level and trends as in U.S. domestic and international data. Then we
compare the capital stocks in foreign subsidiaries and returns on these stocks with BEA
estimates using their methodology. We ﬁnd that the BEA mismeasurement of intangible
earnings and stocks accounts for over 60 percent of the 6.25 percent average diﬀerence in
reported rates of return on FDI.
4.2.1. Incomes
Averages over the period 1960–2006 for the broad categories of GNP are displayed in
Table 4 for the actual and predicted U.S. accounts. This table veriﬁes that our choices
of parameters yield good agreement between the average U.S. and model components of
gross national product. In both theory and data, consumption is about 74 percent of GNP
on average over the sample. Business tangible investment is between 11 and 12 percent
2000. In McGrattan and Prescott (2008), we show that our choice of Sr
ut has almost no aﬀect on the
paper’s main ﬁndings.
24of GNP. The share of nonbusiness investment in the model is set so that it is 15 percent
of GDP (which is close in magnitude to GNP throughout the sample). The ratio of net
exports to GNP is about −1.1 percent on average.
On the income side, the model generates the right split between business and nonbusi-
ness income. We can further break down business income into capital and labor income
if we know how much of intangible investments are expensed by owners of business and
how much by shareholders. In previous work, we assumed that half was expensed by each.
If we assume the same split here, then the model’s average business labor income is 67
percent of business income, just as it is in the United States.
The ﬁnal component of U.S. GNP is net factor income from the rest of world. Here
again, there is good agreement between average U.S. levels and the model’s predictions
because we chose parameters for openness and relative size to match the trends in the
data. Net portfolio income, which is non-FDI equity and interest receipts less payments,
is −0.2 percent of GNP for both the United States and the model. We do not report the
subcategories of portfolio income because of the fact that household portfolio composition
is not determined in theory. The foreign direct investments, on the other hand, are, and we
show both receipts and payments. U.S. receipts have averaged 1.1 percent of GNP while
payments have averaged 0.2 percent of GNP, which is what our model predicts. Adding
up domestic income and net income from the rest of world gives us GNP in the last row of
the table. In the case of the actual accounts, there is an additional statistical discrepancy
of 0.6 percent of GNP.
Figure 2 shows the model predictions for U.S. FDI receipts from their subsidiaries,
U.S. FDI payments from U.S. aﬃliates to their parents, and the U.S. trade balance. These
ﬁt the secular trends by construction since we chose the inputs in Table 2 to generate
comparable trends.16 Most noteworthy is the fact that the model can replicate these
16 In doing so, we did not try to match the U.S. FDI receipts at the end of the sample, which were
25trends. If we set φ = 0 as in the standard growth model, we could not generate the
U.S. patterns.
Figure 3 shows the portfolio net income component of the U.S. current accounts in
the top panel. This includes both dividends from foreign equities and interest on external
debt. In the lower panel, we show the interest income to highlight the fact that the model
matches both the debt and equity components of income.
Figure 4 is an external check on the model ﬁt. In the top panel, we show the share of
consumption in GDP for the United States. The consumption share is around 72 percent
in 1960 for both the model and the data. Over the sample, the rise in the model’s share
is consistent with the U.S. trend. Between 1960 and 2006, the model predicts a rise of
roughly 5 percentage points. Many have interpreted this rise as a sign that U.S. households
are “saving too little.” This is not the case in the model since nothing prevents households
from smoothing consumption optimally. Furthermore, there is a lot of new investment
occurring as the world opens to foreign direct investment.
In the bottom panel of Figure 4, we show the model’s prediction for the U.S. share of
world GDP and the share calculated from the GGDC (2007) dataset. The model shows a
decline in U.S. GDP relative to that of the world consistent with observations up to 2000.
The GGDC data display a larger decline after 2000. As in the case of net exports, the
pattern of relative GDPs for the model depends importantly on patterns in relative TFPs
and populations.
In summary, the model does a remarkably good job generating trends in domestic and
international incomes and products that are close to those observed in the United States.
We therefore regard the model as a useful framework to assess the puzzling patterns in
U.S. foreign capital stocks and returns. We turn to this next.
temporarily high due to a one-time-only tax rate reduction allowed by the American Jobs Creation
Act (AJCA) of 2004. Faust, Gleckman, and Barrett (2004) estimated that $300 billion would be
repatriated under section 965 of the Internal Revenue Code that was added by the AJCA.
264.2.2. Assets and Returns
Figure 5 shows the time series for direct investment positions at current cost. The theoret-
ical counterparts are tangible capital stocks.17 Panel A displays the BEA data. Panel B
displays the model’s equilibrium paths. We see from the BEA data that stocks of U.S. for-
eign subsidiaries were about 6 percent of U.S. GNP in 1960 while the stocks of U.S. aﬃliates
were less than 2 percent of U.S. GNP. Stocks of aﬃliates remained low until the second
half of the 1970s and then rose rapidly, nearly to the level of U.S. foreign subsidiaries by
2006. As a result, the net position ﬁrst rises and then falls roughly in half.18
The model is able to capture the rise and fall in the net asset position, but the level of
the capital stock in U.S. subsidiaries is higher than predicted. Thus, if we compare the BEA
returns and the model returns, we ﬁnd that the U.S. rate of return on direct investment
abroad is lower than the BEA estimate. In Figure 6, we display the same returns as earlier
(see Figure 1) along with the predictions of the model. The BEA reports an average
return on U.S. subsidiary capital of 9.40 percent. The model estimate is 7.08 percent on
average, 2.32 percentage points below the BEA’s. Notice, however, that the model does
well in ﬁtting the returns on foreign capital in the United States. The average return for
U.S. aﬃliates is 3.15 percent while the model predicts 3.12 percent. Our estimates imply
that the mismeasurement of intangible incomes and stocks accounts for about 63 percent
of the return diﬀerential reported by the BEA (that is, 3.96/6.25).
The average actual rate of return on foreign direct investment in the model economies—
both the United States and rest of world—is 4.6 percent over the 1982–2006 period. The
fact that the BEA methodology applied to the model yields an estimate of 7.1 percent for
17 Part of the direct investment position is due to accumulated debt from intercompany loans, but this
is small relative to the value of tangible capital stocks.
18 In McGrattan and Prescott (2005), we capitalized the income of U.S. foreign subsidiaries in order to
estimate the fundamental value of U.S. operations abroad. We estimated the value of the stock of
foreign subsidiaries—net of foreign stocks in the United States—at close to 0.3 times GDP for the
1990s. Similar calculations were made by Hausmann and Sturzenegger (2006). The inconsistency
between our estimate of the net asset position and the BEA’s was a motivating factor for the current
study.
27U.S. capital is due to the fact that multinationals are earning rents on their technology
capital. But foreign multinationals are also earning rents on technology capital. So why
is there a large diﬀerence in predicted FDI returns? The main diﬀerence is the expens-
ing of plant-speciﬁc capital. Foreign direct investment—both tangible and intangible—is
negligible for foreign companies at the beginning of our sample and then increases rapidly.
The expensing of intangible capital lowers their proﬁts and implies a lower return than
U.S. capital abroad. In terms of equation (3.13), the net investment term Xu
I,rt that is
subtracted from income is large.
In McGrattan and Prescott (2008) we do extensive sensitivity analysis. The key
parameters for the implied return diﬀerential in Figure 6 are income shares and depreciation
rates for the two types of intangible capital. We ﬁnd that if these parameters are chosen
to be consistent with observed market values, observed tangible investment rates, and
estimated intangible investment rates, then the model predicts a sizable gap in measured
FDI returns despite there being no actual gap.19 However, if we choose parameters that
imply a low value for the plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, regardless of the implications
for market values and other stocks, then we ﬁnd that the model predicts a smaller gap in
measured FDI returns. For example, if we set δI equal to 6 percent rather than 0 percent
without changing αI and adjust openness parameters and relative size to match the current
account series, we ﬁnd that the ratio of plant-speciﬁc intangible capital to GNP is half of
the benchmark value. In this case, the return diﬀerential is 2.7 percentage points rather
than 4. The smaller gap follows from the fact that the model predicts low returns for
foreign subsidiaries in the United States when their expensed investment in plant-speciﬁc
intangible capital is large.
The income share on technology capital φ is the key parameter in determining the high
rate of return on U.S. foreign subsidiaries. If we increase φ from 7 percent to 8 percent, the
19 See, for example, Nakamura (2003) and Corrado et al. (2005) for estimates of intangible investment
rates.
28model predicts an average rate of return for U.S. FDI of 7.6 percent, up from 7.1 percent
in the benchmark economy. The implied technology capital stock of foreign aﬃliates in
the United States is also higher the higher is φ. If φ is 8 percent, we predict a return of 3.8
percent for foreign subsidiaries in the United States. Thus, interestingly, the larger is the
share on technology capital, the smaller is the implied gap in returns because the model
predicts that companies do less plant-speciﬁc intangible investment as we increase φ.
For all parameterizations that we consider, the return diﬀerential eventually disap-
pears as the growth rate of foreign investment in the United States approaches the rate
of growth of U.S. investment abroad. When this happens, we ﬁnd that all FDI returns
appear to be too high because technology capital is earning rents even when there has
been no foreign direct investment.
4.2.3. Discussion
We have shown that abstracting from intangible investments has large consequences for
reported capital stocks and returns. Much of the unreported capital, however, is not
categorizable as “domestic” or “foreign” on one side of a net asset position. Technology
capital is global by nature, and it is large. In our model economy for the period 1960–2006,
we ﬁnd that the reproducible stock of technology capital of U.S. companies, Mu, averages
0.53 times U.S. GDP, and its market value—given by the third term on the right hand
side of (3.8)—accounts for about 13 percent of the total market value of U.S. corporate
and noncorporate businesses.
How then should we evaluate the performance of our economy? From the standpoint
of the model economy we study, what matters is consumption and hours. These are data
that we observe.
295. Conclusion
We develop and use a multicountry model to show that abstracting from intangible invest-
ments has large consequences for measured rates of return on U.S. foreign subsidiaries and
U.S. aﬃliates of foreign companies. We estimate a return diﬀerential of 4 percent per year
between returns on direct investment of the United States and returns on direct investment
in the United States. This diﬀerence is due to the accounting of intangible investments.
Our paper considers only mismeasurement as leading to diﬀerences in domestic and
foreign rates of return. Other factors that we abstract from may also have played a
role. These include transfer pricing by multinationals to avoid U.S. taxation, diﬀerent
risk characteristics of U.S. and foreign projects, and ﬁnancial market frictions in foreign
countries. We also may have built in too much symmetry in our modeling of the United
States and the rest of world. If, for example, there are diﬀerences in technology-capital
intensities between countries, we would expect larger diﬀerences in returns.
The model that we use does a remarkably good job generating trends in domestic and
international incomes and products that are close to those observed in the United States.
The model time series display large declines in the U.S. trade balance and the reported
U.S. net asset position despite the fact that goods and asset markets are perfectly eﬃcient.
Thus, one of the main lessons we take from our study is that care must be taken when
drawing inference from the international accounts. They can appear to have unsustainable
trends when in fact there are none.20
20 See Backus et al. (2006) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2006) for two sides of the debate concerning the
sustainability of the U.S. current accounts.
30Data Appendix
The data sources for this study are listed below. After each source we note the speciﬁc
tables that we use and where we use them. For more details see McGrattan and Prescott
(2008) and the accompanying materials at our website (http://www.minneapolisfed.org).
National Income and Product Accounts, 1960–2006
• Tables 1.1.5, 2.5.5, 3.1, 3.5. Gross domestic product and components are used
to construct averages in the top panel of Table 4. Adjustments are made so
that the income and product measures are comparable in the theory and data.
Speciﬁcally, consumption taxes and intermediate ﬁnancial services are excluded
from value added and all expenditures on ﬁxed assets are treated as investment.
See McGrattan and Prescott (2008) for details.
• Table 1.7.5. Gross national product (adjusted in the same way as GDP) is used
when constructing all averages in Table 4 and in Figures 2–3 and Figure 5.
• Table 1.13. National income by sector is used to construct business and nonbusi-
ness income in the middle panel of Table 4. In the nonbusiness sector, we include
households, nonproﬁts, general government, and government enterprises.
• Tables 1.14, 3.2. Gross value added of domestic corporations is used to construct
the tax rate on proﬁts (with the Federal Reserve proﬁts excluded) in Table 2.
• Table 4.1. Net exports and net factor incomes are used to construct averages of
the current account components in Table 4. The net exports series is also shown
in Figure 2.
• Table 5.7.5. Private inventories are added to ﬁxed assets for estimating tangible
capital stocks and their depreciation rates.
Fixed Assets, 1960–2006
• Tables 1.1, 6.1. Current-cost net stocks by owner and by sector are used to adjust
measures of consumption and investment in Table 4 and to estimate tangible
capital stocks and their depreciation rates.
International Transactions Accounts, 1960–2006
• Tables 1, 6. U.S. direct investment receipts and payments are plotted in Figure
2 and used to construct the rates of return in Figures 1 and 6. Portfolio incomes
plotted in Figure 3 are determined residually by subtracting direct investment
incomes from net factor incomes in NIPA.
31Flow of Funds Accounts for the United States, 1960–2006
• Table F6. Investment expenditures of households, nonproﬁt institutions, and
governments are counted as nonbusiness investment in Table 4.
• Table F10. Consumer durable depreciation is added to depreciation because we
include durable consumption with tangible investment.
• Tables L213, B100. Corporate and noncorporate equity values are used to esti-
mate business market value.
• Table L107. Direct investment positions at current cost are plotted in Figure 5
and used to construct the rates of return in Figures 1 and 6.
GGDC Total Economy Database, 1960–2006
• GDP in constant 1990 dollars is used to construct U.S. share of world GDP in
Figure 4 using the list of countries below as rest of world.
Rest of world regions and countries
• Canada
• Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, all Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
• Eastern Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Yugoslavia
• Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay,
Venezuela
• Asia: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, S. Korea, Taiwan
• Oceania: Australia, New Zealand
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Discount factor β .98
Leisure weight ψ 1.32
Nonbusiness Sector (%)
Fraction of time at work, i = u,r ¯ Lnb,i/Ni 6.0
Nonbusiness investment, i = u,r ¯ Xnb,i/GDPi 15.4
Nonbusiness value-added, i = u,r ¯ Ynb,i/GDPi 31.2
Fixed Tax Rates (%)
Tax rates on labor i = u,r τl,i 29.0
Tax rate on consumptions, i = u,r τc,i 7.3
Income Shares (%)
Technology capital φ 7.0
Tangible capital (1 − φ)αT 21.4
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital (1 − φ)αI 6.5
Labor (1 − φ)(1−αT−αI) 65.1
Depreciation Rates (%)
Technology capital δM 8.0
Tangible capital δT 6.0
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital δI 0
36TABLE 2. Model Time-Varying Inputs
Tax rates Openness Per U.S.
Relativea Relativea Capita Foreign
Year Populations Dividends Proﬁts ROW U.S. TFPs U.S. Debt Shares
1960 8.20 .400 .408 .8350 .6900 .3730 0 .010
1965 8.42 .400 .403 .8397 .6942 .3727 0 .032
1970 8.64 .400 .396 .8443 .7003 .3725 0 .050
1975 8.86 .397 .386 .8490 .7090 .3722 0 .070
1980 9.08 .370 .375 .8537 .7207 .3719 0 .113
1985 9.30 .246 .361 .8583 .7357 .3714 −.049 .178
1990 9.37 .164 .348 .8630 .7531 .3717 −.098 .220
1995 9.28 .153 .336 .8677 .7718 .3731 −.146 .260
2000 9.16 .152 .327 .8723 .7899 .3743 −.195 .300
2005 9.04 .152 .320 .8770 .8058 .3751 −.244 −.050
2010 8.91 .152 .315 .8817 .8186 .3743 −.270 .000
2015 8.79 .152 .312 .8863 .8283 .3732 −.293 .000
2020 8.67 .152 .310 .8910 .8352 .3723 −.293 .000
2025 8.55 .152 .309 .8957 .8399 .3721 −.293 .000
2030 8.42 .152 .308 .9003 .8431 .3731 −.293 .000
2035 8.30 .152 .307 .9050 .8452 .3745 −.293 .000
a Note: “Relative” implies rest of world relative to the United States.








U.S. companies at home Ku
T,u,0 1.28
U.S. companies abroad Ku
T,r,0 .105
ROW companies at home Kr
T,r,0 2.81
ROW companies abroad Kr
T,u,0 .014
Plant-specific intangible capital stocks
U.S. companies at home Ku
I,u,0 1.16
U.S. companies abroad Ku
I,r,0 .095
ROW companies at home Kr
I,r,0 2.53
ROW companies abroad Kr
I,u,0 .012
a Initial U.S. GDP is normalized to 1 and initial ROW GDP is normalized to 2.2.
38TABLE 4. U.S. and Model Components of U.S. GNP, 1960–2006





Business tangible .113 .116
Nonbusiness .153 .153
Net Exports −.012 −.011
Gross Domestic Product .994 .993
Domestic Income
Business income .678 .683
Nonbusiness income .310 .310
Gross Domestic Income .988 .993
Net Income From Rest of World
Portfolio income (net) −.002 −.002
Direct investment receipts .011 .011
Less: Direct investment payments −.002 −.002
Net Factor Income .006 .007
Statistical Discrepancy .006 —
Gross National Income 1.000 1.000




























Figure 2. BEA and Model Components of the U.S. Current Accounts
(as a Percent of U.S. GNP)






U.S. Portfolio Net Income
Data
Model







U.S. Interest Net Income
Figure 3. BEA and Model Portfolio Income of the U.S. Current Accounts
(Total and Interest Component, as a Percent of U.S. GNP)
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U.S. Share of World GDP
Figure 4. BEA and Model Ratios of U.S. Consumption to GDP
and U.S. GDP to World GDP
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Figure 5. Tangible Capital Stocks in Subsidiaries
(as a Percent of U.S. GNP)
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Figure 6. BEA and Model Rates of Return on Subsidiary Capital
44